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**The Army National Guard:  
Meeting the Needs of The National  
Military Strategy**

**A Monograph  
by**

**Lieutenant Colonel John P. Lewis**

**Infantry**



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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD: MEETING THE NEEDS OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY** by LTC John P. Lewis, USA

67 pages.

The strategic environment significantly changed in the early 1990's with the fall of the Eastern bloc. These changes caused the United States to reassess its National Military Strategy and in turn its military forces. This reassessment resulted in a significant reduction of our active forces. However, the operational environment is ever expanding. Somehow more must now be done with less.

Since the Active Army is getting smaller, it is imperative that the Army National Guard be effective in responding to crises in a shorter amount of time and projecting its combat power to meet regional contingencies. The Army National Guard thus has a greater role today in the National Military Strategy than before.

This monograph examines the effectiveness of the Army National Guard in meeting the National Military Strategy in crisis response, power projection and forward presence. It analyzes the Constitutional and legal foundations of the Army National Guard, the requirements of the National Military Strategy and the operational environment. An examination is made of the Swiss and Israeli militia systems to determine what makes them effective as a military force. The Army's roundout concept and the performance of the Army National Guard in the Gulf War and its conduct of forward presence operations is used in the analysis.

This monograph concludes the Army National Guard is effectively meeting the needs of the National Military Strategy in crisis response and forward presence, but is not in the projection of combat power. To accomplish this requires greater integration, mission prioritization, restructuring the roundout concept, refocusing the training strategy, and changes to the laws (Titles 10 and 32).

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
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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

In the early 1990's the world was swept by dramatic change. The crumbling of the Berlin wall, the invasion in Kuwait, the remarkable results of the Gulf War, and the fall of the Soviet Union. When the Eastern bloc fell, so did the old thoughts on the traditional threats and strategy.<sup>1</sup>

Faced with the results of these changes, the United States realized its military forces would not go untouched by these events. Former President Bush emphasized the need to meet these changes with a new vision to break the paradigms of past thinking. The United States, to meet the new era and the changes in the operational environment, would have to do more than simply reduce its military forces. It would have to restructure them as well.<sup>2</sup>

We are today in a debate over the changes required in our political, economic, industrial and military infrastructures to meet the security needs of our nation. Political leaders and military planners have reduced significantly defense spending, force structure, manpower and the overseas commitments for our military forces. However, the world is unstable with the conflicts in Bosnia and Iraq, the unrest in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the strife in Somalia. All of these areas are liable for military intervention. The dilemma for the political and military leaders is how to do more with less.

The strategic issue is how to best integrate the Regular Army, Reserves, and the Army National Guard units that make up the total forces of the United States.<sup>3</sup> Effective integration is critical to our future success on the battlefield. In the 1970's General Creighton W. Abrams Jr., the Army Chief of Staff, sought to create an integrated

military force structure that could not be committed to combat without the Reserves and the Army National Guard.<sup>4</sup> In the past, the Active Army was not required to place a significant reliance on the combat capabilities of the Army National Guard. There was a large standing professional army ready to handle any immediate crisis. The Army National Guard was but a supplemental force. Today with the significant reductions of the Active Army, this will no longer be the case. The Active Army will depend more on the Army National Guard than ever before. Consequently, a re-appraisal of roles and missions of our military forces is required.<sup>5</sup> The Army National Guard has served as a cornerstone of our national defense for over 200 years. However, with today's greater reliance on the Army National Guard, will it be possible for it to meet the demands of a National Military Strategy keyed on power projection?

It is an accepted practice among advanced industrialized open societies to have both a regular professional army and reserve system to meet their security needs. However, there is a question whether militia organizations or reserves can be effective. In the past, it was possible to turn reservists into effective soldiers in a relatively short period of time, but in those days, training was simpler. Today technology has become more complex. More training is needed and one wonders whether a part-time unit or soldier can be effective.<sup>6</sup> The greater reliance on the Army National Guard makes it necessary to determine if non-professionals can be made into effective units and soldiers.

The Army National Guard is a military force with federal and state requirements. This duality puts a strain in the organization that could



damage its military effectiveness. However, there are examples of militia or reserves being effective in modern war. The Swiss and Israeli systems are unique and epitomize efficiency in a militia concept. Are there any lessons from these two alternatives that can be made to improve our own Army National Guard system? These areas will provide a measure to gauge how effective the Army National Guard is meeting the needs of the National Military Strategy.

## **II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS**

The Army National Guard is an institution required by law.<sup>7</sup> Historically, Americans have an aversion to large standing armies. The country's defense places a strong belief in the citizen soldier being used for emergency purposes. There has been a strong militia tradition in which local military forces were raised and organized by the states.<sup>8</sup> However, the actual combat performance of the militia in the War of Independence was generally poor.<sup>9</sup> There was a need for a standing army.<sup>10</sup> The key issue was over the integration of both forces to make the army effective.

The Constitution addressed the issue of the militia tradition and the necessity of national defense. The federal government was given the responsibility to raise and maintain an Army and Navy.<sup>11</sup> The militia was maintained under Constitutional Article I and the Second amendment. The states kept their own military forces. The federal government could call up the militia for emergency purposes and defense. In such cases the militia would be provisioned by the federal

government with the states having responsibility for the appointment of its officers, training and discipline as designated by Congress.<sup>12</sup>

Since the 19th century, more federal standards for the organization and training of the militia have been mandated through the laws and Reform Acts to improve its performance. Today the civil laws (Title 10 and 32) define what the Army National Guard can be called upon to do. The Army National Guard and Reserves are to provide qualified personnel and trained units for the defense of the nation. These personnel and units are subject to active duty in times of national emergencies, or whenever the national security requires it.<sup>13</sup> The trained units and personnel are designated in three categories of reserve forces: the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve.<sup>14</sup> The Ready Reserve has an authorized strength by law up to 2.9 million. The Army National Guard as part of the Ready Reserve is authorized up to 980 thousand.<sup>15</sup>

The President has the federal authority to call on the Army National Guard whenever he deems necessary and to specify training requirements. The law supports three basic levels of mobilization: Presidential Selective Call-up, Partial Mobilization, and Full Mobilization. Training of the Army National Guard is specified by law. The responsibility for specifying standards in training rests with the Active Army and compliance to conduct the training to the standards is placed on the Army National Guard.<sup>16</sup> The states retain the authority for training. The law mandates the number of required training drills and further specifies the length of active duty training. The Army National Guard must train in at least 48 scheduled drills or training periods annually and serve on active duty for training for not less

than 14 days and not more than 30 days during each year.<sup>17</sup> Federal limitations are also applied by law when Army National Guard units or selected members are called to active duty to support requirements for training or in lieu of active duty for training. Federal activation initiated to support federal training cannot be done without the consent of the governor of that state and for not more than 15 days a year.<sup>18</sup>

Title 32 fully supports the federalization and use of the Army National Guard to meet the federal and state needs. There are differences between Title 10 and 32 worth noting concerning structure and integration of both components. The President, under Title 32, may restructure the Army National Guard to meet the needs of national security. The organization and designation of the types of National Guard units rests with the President. However, no changes may be made by unit organization or allotment of a unit, when it is solely located within a state, without the consent of the governor.<sup>19</sup> If restructuring of the National Guard is required to meet the National Military Strategy, a significant political effort will be required to achieve it.

Title 32 allows officers of the Regular Army in times of peace to perform the duties of the Chief of Staff in an Army National Guard division. This was provisioned by law to assist in the prompt mobilization of the Army National Guard in time of war or national emergency.<sup>20</sup> Under this provision Title 32 opens a legal avenue for the appointment of Regular Army officers to directly serve with the Army National Guard in a capacity beyond detailing to only assist in administration and training.

The Army National Guard may be used directly by the state to maintain internal state law and order. The state governor has the authority to use the Army National Guard within his state as he deems necessary. However, legal restrictions do apply for the use of the Army National Guard when they are federalized to provide federal assistance to a state. *Posse Comitatus*, passed in 1878, limits the use of any federal military forces in maintaining civil law and order and in resolving non-military disputes within a separate state. Federal assistance may be given in times of declared emergency directly to state governments in order to establish civil order or suppress insurrection. However, for the President to do so he must receive the request from the state governor; the assistance can only be in the numbers requested by the state and may only be used as the governor deems necessary.<sup>21</sup>

The Constitution, laws, and Reform Acts provide ample flexibility to call on the Army National Guard to meet federal and state requirements. The Constitution gives our government the ability to pragmatically meet changing military needs when dictated by changes in strategic environments, economics, politics and technological advancement.<sup>22</sup> Greater federal control has been placed upon the Army National Guard with no relief from its state and civilian responsibilities. Federal control is not total. The states will always have a measure of control as intended by the Constitution and the existing laws. To change this reality will require changes to the Constitution, the laws and Reform Acts.

### **III. THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY**

The National Military Strategy identifies missions, both specified and implied, that are required to be met by the Active Army and the Army National Guard. The National Military Strategy is built upon four strategic foundations: strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution. Eight strategic principles serve as the linchpins to the strategy. They are: readiness, collective security, arms control, maritime and aerospace superiority, strategic agility, decisive force, technological superiority and power projection. The foundations and principles serve as the primary strategic concepts in using U.S. military forces. Two of the four strategic foundations: forward presence and crisis response, and the key strategic principle of power projection, determine the effectiveness of the Army National Guard in supporting the National Military Strategy.

The National Military Strategy is based on both nuclear and conventional deterrence.<sup>23</sup> The existing nuclear capabilities of China, India, Pakistan, Russia and the Ukraine require the U.S. to provide a credible nuclear defense and umbrella to protect existing allies and itself. Successful implementation of strategic deterrence will require the U.S. to continue a nuclear deterrent capability.

Several regional states, such as, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, China, North Korea, Ukraine, Russia and Vietnam have formidable military forces that can threaten regional stability and areas of our vital interests. In response to this capability the U.S. must ensure it pos-

sesses a credible conventional military force that can deter and, if necessary, respond to regional or global conflicts. The Army National Guard is a key contributor to conventional deterrence.

The strategic foundation of crisis response requires the rapid deployment of conventional military forces to meet regional conflicts and war.<sup>24</sup> Military forces are also to respond rapidly to natural disaster, humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, nation building and civil assistance missions. These missions may be considered as non-traditional and non-combat, but their appearance in the past year in Somalia, Florida, and Los Angeles has in fact moved them into the forefront of military thought.

The key strategic principle of successful power projection is that the forces must be able to rapidly meet any contingency. It has a direct influence on the credibility of our deterrence and responsiveness, contributes to regional stability and reinforces our collective security.<sup>25</sup>

Power projection will become more important as our permanent stationing overseas declines and our regional commitments increase. Power projection provides the physical means to defeat any threat across the spectrum of conflict whether it be traditional or non-traditional, domestic or international.

Forward presence as a strategic foundation allows the United States to selectively place military forces into regions before a crisis. It allows the U.S. to project stability into areas not directly related to specific national objectives, vital interests or security agreements. By doing so, these forces serve to effectively inhibit aggression within a region.<sup>26</sup> The concept of forward presence allows

the U.S. to maintain regional visibility, access to vital interests, and deterrence in a region. It will require the Army National Guard to play a larger role in the future.

In addition there are several state and federal domestic missions which place demands on the Army National Guard. The state and federal domestic needs require Army National Guard units for civil defense, humanitarian aid, local emergencies, law and order assistance, civil disturbance, key asset protection, counter drug operations, disaster relief, social community support and civil support programs.<sup>27</sup>




Figure 1.

How does the National Military Strategy intend to use the Army National Guard to meet the missions of the new operational environment? The Reserves and the Army National Guard are mentioned only in the context of certain units maintaining a higher readiness to assist and augment responding active units.<sup>28</sup> The National Security Strategy calls for a reshaping of the National Guard and Reserve forces so they can contribute to new circumstances.<sup>29</sup> This suggests

we must use the Army National Guard in more innovative ways beyond just a role as a follow-on supplemental force.

The National Military Strategy virtually excludes Army National Guard combat units from participation early in traditional combat missions and fails to promote their first use to rapidly respond to the non-traditional missions. Any strategy reducing the use of the Army National Guard or Reserves in contingencies is not likely to be accepted by Congress or the American people.<sup>30</sup> As the base force grows smaller and with the reliance on a "volunteer" force, the Army no longer will have the option to exclude the Army National Guard from a role in crisis response.

The National Military Strategy primarily views Army National Guard combat units as a supplement to the Active Army regardless of the mission. A response to a regional crisis is done primarily with combat and combat support units drawn entirely from the active component with the exception of a limited number of support and mobility assets.<sup>31</sup> Supplemental forces are drawn from the Army National Guard and Reserves. The Army National Guard has a force structure of 422,727.<sup>32</sup> This force structure consists mostly of combat units organized as 10 combat divisions and 20 combat brigades (Appendix A).<sup>33</sup> It does not seem logical to make substantial investments in the Army National Guard if these combat resources cannot be used early to meet regional contingencies. As such, the National Military Strategy has simply left out a significant combat resource in our military inventory. A strategy focused on power projection and quick decisive victory, with a shrinking active force structure, cannot negate the use of Army National Guard combat units early in crisis response.



The National Military Strategy needs to be changed to better integrate the Army National Guard combat units with a viable role in crisis response. There are alternative militia systems which use their forces in immediate roles for crisis response.

#### **IV. MILITIA ALTERNATIVES: THE SWISS AND ISRAELI SYSTEMS**

The Swiss and Israeli systems were chosen for their effectiveness in meeting the needs of their countries defense and using militia combat units in crisis response. Four aspects will be reviewed. First, how are they organized? Second, how are the militia and the professional army used? Third, what relationship do they have with each other? Fourth, what concepts of their systems have application to our own Active Army and the Army National Guard?

The Swiss militia system has been recognized as a model organization for its defense, structure and cost effectiveness.<sup>34</sup> This stems from a militia concept of total defense. Within the total defense concept the following tasks are stipulated by political policy: deterring war by total preparation, maintaining the capability to wage war to ensure the survival of the nation, possessing the means to resist the enemy in occupied areas, maintaining autonomy in peace and promoting the militia for self-defense purposes.<sup>35</sup>

The Swiss Constitution prohibits the maintaining of a standing army; instead, they have a militia. Just as our political system realized the need for a permanent professional military, so too have the Swiss. The Swiss militia is organized into four corps. Three are full field corps and one is a mountain corps that contain 61% of the total

force. They are composed mainly of infantry, armor and artillery. One corps also includes the air force and air defense organizations. The four corps consist of 12 divisions with 14,000 to 17,000 men each. In addition there are 20 brigades responsible for the forward defense positions.<sup>36</sup> These militia forces are relied upon for providing the first line of defense in times of crisis and war. In aggregate numbers alone, the Swiss Militia has more personnel than the United States Army. It has 13.4% of its population in its militia, the highest in the world.<sup>37</sup> This is a sizeable force for a nation of neutrality with no external commitments. All of this is achieved by mandatory conscription.

Service in the militia is a way of life. Compulsory service is mandated by the Constitution and civil law for the male population. The commitment is long term and the men serve at intervals over thirty years. Officers serve for 35 years.<sup>38</sup> The Swiss society does not take lightly this obligation of service. Those looking from outside of Switzerland see a nation of neutrality and a liberal society. But those on the inside of Switzerland understand fully their citizenship responsibilities to the defense. The mandatory service requirement is absolute and unconditional; service obligations cannot be refused on either religious or political beliefs.<sup>39</sup>

Units in the Swiss Militia are categorized by prioritized missions, readiness levels and age groups. The "Elite" units have men 20-32 years old; they are the first-line combat units. As the men grow older they move to the *Landeswehr*, the internal defense forces. The third group, *Landstrum*, is the home guard and civil defense units that have all men in service until the age of 50, the year they are allowed to

retire. The units have both a tiered readiness and an alignment of specific missions for defense and domestic needs. Missions are prioritized by their readiness levels and the specific missions for which they are trained. The "Elite" have immediate combat missions, the *Landeswehr* are responsible for fortification defense and the *Landstrum* have the internal domestic security and civil defense.

The Swiss maintain a small professional staff of officers, NCOs and men. The professional staff serve primarily as administrators and trainers for the militia, the most important being the professional officer and non-commissioned officer instructors.<sup>40</sup> As trainers they are fully integrated within their schooling system and within the militia units. The professional officers provide the technical training to maintain proficiency on modern weapon systems. The militia units are well equipped with over 800 main battle tanks, 900 long range artillery pieces and 1,000 mechanized infantry vehicles.<sup>41</sup>

Professional service goes beyond administration and training. By law the professionals also must serve within the ranks of militia units. They are fully integrated within the militia and promotion is based on their service in the militia. The militia units are commanded by and organized with both professional and militia soldiers. Without service in the militia, promotion is limited.<sup>42</sup> The approach the Swiss have taken with integration tying service, training and promotion together with the professional soldiers, ensures combat readiness and a stability within the militia units.

The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) model bears many similarities to the Swiss Total Defense model. The similarities were not by chance, as the IDF concept was developed by the Israelis in 1949 after exten-

sive exchanges with the Swiss government and militia.<sup>43</sup> Two views essential to the IDF concept are *Hitnadvuth* (meaning principles of social organization) and *Mamalachtiut* (meaning statism).

*Hitnadvuth* has four fundamentals: mobilization, voluntary participation, individual responsibility and, when called upon, responding quickly with initiative.<sup>44</sup> The volunteerism of the Israeli society is a driving force that has provided the country with a citizen base of manpower and a flexible immediate response capability. This volunteerism helped to shape the social political system and contributed to the development of the statism of the country.

*Mamalachtiut* and the workings of the state provide the basic welfare, housing, education, security and labor necessities to the people. The *Mamalachtiut* places the needs of the state before the needs of its individual citizens and the citizens are resources for its services.<sup>45</sup> These two concepts of volunteerism link citizen responsibility to defense of the nation and provide a manpower base that significantly contributes to the economy of force provided by the IDF. Like the Swiss militia, the IDF requires compulsory national service.

The Israeli economy of force structure was predicated on an aversion to standing armies. Israel, like the United States, had learned hard lessons in its history of the oppression that could be placed on a society by a standing army of occupation. Economic limitations prohibit the maintenance of a large standing army to meet the internal security and defense needs of Israel. Its relatively small population could not support the military needs full time and still meet the *Mamalchtiut* requirements of the state (economic infrastructure) to support its citizens.<sup>46</sup>

The IDF maintains a small permanent service cadre, *Keva*, that are primarily regular army officers and NCO's. The *Keva* serve as the primary source for leadership and trainers within the service. The manpower for the IDF comes from the *Hova* compulsory service soldiers which provide the majority of personnel to the regular and reserve front line units. The bulk of the reserve, *Miluimm*, consists of a large number of units and individuals who are the majority of the total force. <sup>47</sup>

The IDF has developed an immediately deployable reserve that is 82.6% (494,000) of its total force strength of 598,000. The regular army forces number 104,000, of which 88% are compulsory service soldiers.<sup>48</sup> This force is organized into three combined arms corps consisting of 13 combined arms divisions with approximately 365,000 army reserve personnel.<sup>49</sup>

What makes the IDF successful is its policy of total integration of the regulars and the reserves. This integration policy places officers from each component in command of divisions, brigades and battalions. The senior levels of command are mostly regular officers; however, not all division commanders are regulars. The only stipulation is that reserve officers command the reserve units.<sup>50</sup> The integration goes much deeper than just positions of command. The division and brigade staffs are mixed with both regular and reserve officers, NCO's and soldiers. The assignment of and mixing of soldiers in all components is considered a normal process and does not inhibit individual promotion or progress. Like the Swiss militia system, the institutional training and long range planning of the total force rests

with the regulars. Virtually all key training commands, schools and training installations are the responsibility of the regulars.<sup>51</sup>

The benefits of this level of integration are substantial. The regulars and reserves are mutually supporting components and the attitudes of the personnel in each component are positive in promoting a total force concept. The operational requirements of the IDF cannot be accomplished without the implicit support and use of the other component. All training, organizational structures and readiness are intertwined. The readiness of the IDF is also impressive. The reserve forces are capable of achieving rapid mobilization and moving directly into combat with little or no post-mobilization training. This success is due to their concept of total integration and an increase in the training of their reserve units. The average active duty for training is approximately 42 days, but the total for their units varies, and can be as high as 60 days per year.<sup>52</sup>

This total force concept contributes to a military service environment of cooperation rather than competition. The commitment of the IDF and the defense of Israel cannot be accomplished without fully committing the reserves as combat, combat support and combat service support units. This is just the opposite of the United States Army and the National Military Strategy. The U.S. Army requires no Army National Guard units in the first 24 hours as does the IDF.<sup>53</sup>

The Swiss and Israeli systems ensure a uniform performance of combat skills, training and leadership while on active duty. The Israeli reserve system has a direct flow of trained personnel to maintain ready reserve units.<sup>54</sup> This reinforces standards and readiness by placing soldiers with practical experience and military skills into

their militia while they are still relatively proficient. The United States Army should adopt such a recruiting and post enlistment strategy.

These approaches result in two militia organizations which provide over 60% of their country's front-line military forces. They are combat effective and adequately meet the defense needs of their respective nations. Unlike the United States, they do not have global responsibilities with requirements to project forces beyond the immediacy of their own borders or regions near the borders. Still the United States Army and the Army National Guard can learn from the strengths of these two models of total force integration. These strengths can be applied to meet the challenges of the National Military Strategy and mission requirements.

## **V. MEETING THE CHALLENGES**

The challenge for the Army National Guard is to demonstrate their affectiveness as a military force when called upon to act. From the National Military Strategy three critieria were identified to measure the effectiveness of the Army National Guard. They were crisis response, power projection and forward presence. These criteria provide the rationale to draw conclusions as to how effective the Army National Guard is in meeting the needs of the National Military Strategy. The effectiveness, or lack of it, by the Army National Guard can be assessed by their performance in the Gulf War, support in forward presence operations and such non-tradtional activities as disaster relief, counter-drug operations, and civil assistance.

For the Army National Guard to be effective in meeting these criteria it must effectively mobilize, deploy and project combat units (Infantry, Armored Roundout brigades, Artillery, Aviation, Air Defense and Special Forces) and combat support units (Engineers, Signal, Military Police and Military Intelligence). There is a key difference to note in Army National Guard combat units. Only infantry and armor brigades are roundout units. Artillery brigades are non-roundout and these were the combat brigades that effectively deployed in the Gulf War.

The Army National Guard in the Gulf War was mobilized to meet a "come as you are scenario." This requires the Army and the Army National Guard to achieve mass by rapidly mobilizing and then quickly deploying.<sup>55</sup> To meet its requirements in crisis response the Army National Guard was mobilized under the Graduated Mobilization Response System (GMR) which was developed to mobilize the total force. An effective mobilization plan will ensure the Regular Army and the Army National Guard are inextricably woven together and that a balanced force is projected with both components considered together.<sup>56</sup>

The GMR is a flexible decision making process with five levels of response options.<sup>57</sup> Essentially, this gives the President a menu of response alternatives that are not sequential to implement. The five levels are Presidential Selective Reserve Callup (PSRC), Partial Mobilization, Total Mobilization, and Mobilization for Domestic Crisis. The two primary mobilization phases executed during the Gulf War were PSRC and Partial Mobilization.



Phase I is the PSRC. The President, by executive order may supplement active duty forces with up to 200,000 members of the selective reserve for 90 days. This option may be extended for up to 90 additional days.<sup>58</sup> This action does not require a declaration of national emergency, but the President is required to report to Congress within 24 hours on the situation and for what purpose the force is to be used.

Phase II is Partial Mobilization. To execute this phase requires a declared Presidential or Congressional state of national emergency. This phase is executed when approved by Congress. It may be implemented without PSRC and authorizes up to two million members of the ready reserve to be mobilized for up to 24 months.<sup>59</sup>

Phase III is Full Mobilization, initiated when Congress has declared a state of national emergency or war. Full Mobilization authorizes the call-up of all forces not already activated in the active and reserve force structure to duty. These forces are to be fully equipped, manned and sustained.<sup>60</sup> Those called up in this phase are for the duration of the war or emergency and up to six months after its conclusion.

Total Mobilization, Phase IV, expands the armed forces by generating and activating units that do not exist in the current active forces.<sup>61</sup> This phase begins the implementation of reconstitution per the National Military Strategy.

The final phase is used to meet the non-traditional missions by mobilizing and expanding active military forces during peacetime domestic crisis.<sup>62</sup> For example, when the President federalized the California National Guard (1992) in Operation Garden Plot to respond to the Los Angeles riots, he used Phase V.<sup>63</sup> Basically units or

individuals are mobilized from the selected reserve to protect life, to restore vital federal activities or to protect federal property.

For the Army National Guard to be effective in crisis response it will need to mobilize itself early along with the active force. Army National Guard combat, combat support and combat service support units must be able to deploy within the specified time lines in existing contingency plans.

Early deployment contingencies require specific mobilization and deployment criteria for crisis response. Success requires the lead brigade for combat operations to be on the ground by C+4 through airlift. One division is to follow by C+12 by airlift, with two heavy divisions deployed from CONUS or OCONUS by C+30 using airlift or sealift. By C+75 a full Corps with its Corps Support Command (COSCOM) and Army Echelons Above Corps will be projected on the ground.<sup>64</sup>

The results from the Gulf War show the Army National Guard had an effective mobilization plan to support the crisis response contingencies of the Active Army. The Army National Guard was rapidly alerted, mobilized and deployed to the Gulf. The Army National Guard successfully provided combat and combat support units to the Gulf War. Eleven Army National Guard brigade and group headquarters were mobilized and deployed. They included three engineer groups, three medical groups, two field artillery brigades, one air traffic control group, one theater area support group, and one corps support group. Various types and numbers of battalions deployed to include Artillery, Military Police, Maintenance, Transportation, Engineers, Medical and Ammunition units. A total of thirty Army National Guard battalions

mobilized and deployed to the crisis. The average time for battalion level units from federalization to deployment was 33 days.<sup>65</sup>

In total, the Department of the Army federalized 398 Army National Guard units and 62,411 soldiers for Operation Desert Storm. Of all the Army National Guard units federalized, 67% deployed within 45 days, 41% within 30 days and 28% within 20 days.<sup>66</sup> The majority of Army National Guard units met the federal requirements for mobilization, to include the roundout brigades.

The mobilization process, although successful, was not without problems. Problems ranging from Guard members not having attended basic training to the lack of physical fitness and severe dental problems resulted in several thousand being non-deployable.<sup>67</sup> These shortfalls resulted in Army National Guard units having significant shortages of personnel. The personnel shortages required the exchanging of Guard soldiers from other state units.<sup>68</sup> This cross leveling reduced the combat readiness and deployability of those Army National Guard units from which they were taken.

Although the Army National Guard successfully mobilized combat units, to include the roundout brigades, it was never able to deploy them. This was partially due to problems in federalizing those units to meet the military contingencies and in their combat readiness.

The National Command Authority chose initially to federalize the selected reserve units under PSRC, Title 10, section 673 (b). By Title 10, the PSRC mobilization statutory time limits (total of 180 days) for the deployment of selected reserves (up to 200,000 personnel) placed artificial constraints on their early use.<sup>69</sup> The President elected to invoke the callup of the selected reserve on August 22.

1990. However, the decision to mobilize Army National Guard roundout units took nearly four more months.

The National Command Authority stated the reason for failing to activate the combat roundout brigades were that *Desert Shield* was a deter and defend mission with the possibility for immediate combat. The reality to meet this mission was that only Active Army combat units could be used to meet this requirement.<sup>70</sup>

This resulted in the 24th Infantry Division being alerted for deployment in August, 1990, but its roundout brigade (48th Infantry Brigade, Mechanized, Georgia) was not mobilized when the President alerted the parent division. The brigade was not mobilized until November.<sup>71</sup> The difficulty for the Army National Guard roundout brigades was not in meeting the requirements for mobilization, but rather in meeting the post-mobilization training and technical validation requirements. By not comprehending fully the restrictions of the PSRC mobilization policy, and by failing to mobilize the roundout brigades early, the shortages of personnel could not be filled by the IRR. The Army National Guard units lost three months that could have been used in post-mobilization training.

The time constraints under PSRC did not equal the time required for mobilization, post-mobilization training, deployment, shipping equipment and execution of the mission. Those Army National Guard units shipping equipment by sea had only 140-150 days in theater. The amount of time it took to have their equipment arrive in theater took as much as 45 days alone.<sup>72</sup>

The National Command Authority missed the opportunity to fully implement the deployment of the total force. The failure to call early

for Army National Guard roundout brigades damaged the units' ability to meet the power projection concept of the National Military Strategy. Partial mobilization would have been a better choice taken by the National Command Authority. Partial mobilization allows up to two million personnel and the IRR to be called up for up to two years.

Even though the mobilization process is not sequential by design, it appears that the decision process by the National Command Authority and the Army was. They did not recognize the primary decision criteria for mobilizing the Army National Guard combat units. There is a need to develop criteria for committing the Army National Guard to combat that is clearly understood by the political and senior army leadership. Proposals have been made identifying policy, force composition and readiness as the primary criteria to mobilize the Army National Guard combat brigades.<sup>73</sup>

The Army National Guard was measurably effective in crisis response, mobilizing and deploying units to the regional crisis. All of those Army National Guard units that deployed met the crisis response time lines specified by mobilization doctrine. This performance was a major step forward in validating the total force concept.

One of the contentions in the debate on the effectiveness of part time military forces is that they cannot be as technically competent as a professional force, nor can they meet the technological demands of modern war. The Army National Guard effectively demonstrated technical competency in those units that deployed to the Gulf War. Both combat and combat support units were mission capable and successfully met their traditional combat roles. Two field artillery brigades demonstrated both professional and technical competency in

the Gulf War. The 142d Field Artillery Brigade (Arkansas) and the 196th Field Artillery Brigade (Tennessee) each met their missions and performed to combat standards. Each brigade significantly contributed to providing fire support to combat maneuver units in the desert.<sup>74</sup> The 265th Engineer Group supported the XVIII Corps with four combat engineer battalions. The Army National Guard Special Forces were able to provide selected personnel in support of combat missions in the Gulf War. Members of the 20th Special Forces augmented teams in the 10th Special Forces Group (A) conducting relief operations in Iraq.<sup>75</sup> But their performance did not settle the competency question. There were competency problems in the roundout brigades.

For the Army National Guard's crisis response to be credible it must be able to fully project its combat power to support the needs of the National Military Strategy. Power projection is the cornerstone to the National Military Strategy and the cornerstone to power projection for the Army National Guard is the Army's roundout strategy and its roundout brigades. They are critical combat resources for the Active Army.

Roundout is a program in which units from the Active Army component are organizationally aligned to a unit from the reserve component.<sup>76</sup> The current roundout concept provides designated Army National Guard brigade combat units to parent Active Army divisions. In the current Army National Guard structure there are six combat brigades so designated (Appendix A). Since the early 1970's the roundout brigade has been accepted politically and by the senior army lead-

ership as a force to be committed to combat as part of its parent division under any situation.

General Schwarzkopf as the Commanding General of the 24th Infantry Division stated, "Roundout is a fact of life, the 48th Brigade of the Georgia National Guard is the third brigade of my division....I expect them to fight along side us." In 1990, 7 out of 18 Active Army divisions had roundout brigades.<sup>77</sup> Although three Army National Guard roundout brigades were effectively mobilized, none were deployed to the Gulf War.

The lack of Army National Guard brigade roundout units in the Gulf War significantly decreased the Army National Guard effectiveness in power projection. Only one ground combat maneuver unit in the Army Reserves deployed outside of the United States. The 3d battalion, 87th Infantry [Fort Collins, Co] was validated within 18 days of activation. It deployed to replace units in Europe as part of VII Corps, which had deployed to Southwest Asia.<sup>78</sup> The Army mobilized three Army National Guard roundout brigades. They were the 48th Infantry Brigade, 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), and 155 Armor Brigade. None of these brigades were able to project and deploy to the Gulf War. The causes are worth review.

Each roundout unit represented a significant portion of a parent division's actual combat power. It was not until the Gulf War that the flaw in this brigade roundout concept was fully recognized. The assumption that on M-day the readiness of the roundout brigade would be capable of providing a combat unit in a short amount of time was not valid. Most of the readiness reports indicated combat ready roundout units in 28 to 40 days.<sup>79</sup> The brigade roundout units required

significantly more training to be combat capable. This flaw resulted in a substantial amount of combat power which could not be immediately drawn upon. The deficiencies in the brigade roundout policy and the units' peacetime training readiness resulted in none of the roundout brigades leaving the United States. Only the 48th Infantry Brigade (Georgia) was validated as combat ready.<sup>80</sup>

There was no significant time identified for post-mobilization training. The three roundout brigades mobilized required a significant amount of post-mobilization training (3-4 months).<sup>81</sup> The Army had not established a proper peacetime training program for the Army National Guard roundout brigades to meet early deployment, nor did the Army have any contingencies to do so. The failure to have a properly focused training program ensuring the readiness of the Army National Guard roundout brigades was fostered by the fact that there were no contingency or mobilization plans calling for early deployment of these units to combat.<sup>82</sup> They were meant only to increase the combat power of the Active Army in a protracted European scenario.

Prior to the Gulf War no roundout brigades were required to immediately deploy in crisis response. The post-mobilization training time would be dependent on the unit's combat readiness.<sup>83</sup> The lack of combat readiness is the central issue for not deploying the Army National Guard roundout brigades.<sup>84</sup>

Combat readiness was negated by not having a standardized training program or post-mobilization training plan founded on go-to-war tasks and drills. The roundout brigades had difficulty achieving the gunnery skills to meet Army standards. For example, an Active Army battalion normally meets gunnery standards within seven days and the



Army National Guard's battalions in the 155th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) required 17-24 days.<sup>85</sup> Post-mobilization training time can be reduced by realigning the training focus to a centralized training strategy.<sup>86</sup> The Army National Guard roundout brigades were eventually replaced by Active Army combat brigades not affiliated with the Active Army divisions.

The unknown question is, how much training is required to have a trained and ready Army National Guard combat unit? The Army assessed that Army National Guard maneuver brigade post-mobilization training was 90 days and a division would require 365 days.<sup>87</sup> Analysis of the Gulf War indicates this assessment is optimistic. In comparing mobilization times and validation of the Army National Guard roundout brigades, one can determine 90 days is an absolute best-case situation. The Army National Guard 48th Brigade (Mechanized) did it in 115 days.<sup>88</sup> The other two brigades never achieved validation. In the worst-case situation it can take at least 150 days (time from mobilization to the end of the Gulf War) or more.

However, the assessment of how long it will take goes beyond just training time. The assessment of 90 days may be unreliable based on the lack of standardized validation plans and the tremendous amount of Active Army resources dedicated to the post-mobilization training. The post mobilization training effort required nearly 9,000 Active Army trainers and other personnel.<sup>89</sup> With a reduced Active Army force structure it is not likely these numbers would be available. To decrease the post-mobilization training time requires an intensified peacetime training program.

After the Gulf War, the Army established three levels of response units: forward presence units consisting of three active divisions in Europe and Korea, six crisis response divisions (U.S. based active units with no roundouts) and three early reinforcing divisions (U.S. based active units with roundouts). Additional Army National Guard brigades were designated as roundup units. Roundup units are aligned to a fully structured Active Army parent division to provide an additional unit for employment and combat flexibility.<sup>90</sup> Active Army divisions would be given total responsibility for short notice, crisis response missions. Active Army crisis response divisions now have no Army National Guard roundout units in peacetime.<sup>91</sup>

The Army National Guard was eliminated from any immediate participation as roundout brigade units. This policy on the surface appears to solve the problem of having combat ready units for immediate response, but it fails to maximize the use of the of Army National Guard's twenty combat brigades and the battalions within them. If the probability that these units will not be used early or the need for power projection is high, then the retention of these Army National Guard units is a waste of money and force structure. This policy does little to solve the criticism that the roundout brigades were not ready to deploy with their parent units. The roundouts did not deploy because they did not have a sufficient readiness posture. This was the crux of the problem.<sup>92</sup> The Army National Guard did not adequately meet the needs of the National Military Strategy in projecting its combat power.

The final area to evaluate the effectiveness of the Army National Guard is in its abilities to actively provide units to support forward

presence and non-combat missions. The Army National Guard has been highly successful in meeting these requirements of the National Military Strategy and to say they are not a significant contributor to forward presence would be an understatement.<sup>93</sup>

In FY 1990, 292 state domestic emergencies required the Army National Guard to respond. There were 77 domestic natural disasters and six civil-order missions during the last year. Those included forest fires, floods, riots, and search and rescue missions. Over 23,000 guardsmen responded by providing 207,000 man-days to accomplish these missions.<sup>94</sup> Each of these state operations has given the Army National Guard unique experience in domestic and non-traditional activities. For example, the Florida National Guard relief efforts during Hurricane Andrew were cited for exceptional professional competence and response.<sup>95</sup> These domestic skills were a direct contributor to the successful employment of over 21,475 Army National Guard personnel and 724 units in forward presence operations.<sup>96</sup>

During FY 1992 the number of domestic missions has risen significantly. The Army National Guard in the counter-drug mission alone provided approximately 730,000 man-days<sup>97</sup> The trends for greater involvement of the Army and the Army National Guard in domestic missions and non-traditional forward presence activities are likely to continue. These forward presence operations have been in both the traditional and non-traditional roles. During 1992 in the Pacific Command over 50% of reserve overseas deployment training was conducted by Army National Guard units from 31 states.<sup>98</sup> They participated in command post exercises and field training exercises as well

as providing medical, communications, civil affairs and engineer support in the Pacific region.

The same holds true in other parts of the world as well. In Southern Command the Army National Guard has contributed over 15,000 personnel and various units to their forward presence support. In these operations the Army National Guard provided civil assistance, counter drug support, mobile training teams, humanitarian relief, disaster relief and engineer support.<sup>99</sup> Already in this fiscal year the Army National Guard and Reserves Special Forces have participated in over 182 overseas deployment training missions varying from Haitian control, mobile training teams, and counter-drug operations to psychological operations.<sup>100</sup>

The Army National Guard is performing these missions with a professional competence that in many ways exceeds the Active Army. Its ability to respond to the non-traditional missions has a direct relationship to the skills they must use in the domestic support of their states. At the same time they are providing valuable resources in different regional theaters, for numerous non-traditional missions that otherwise would have to be done by Active Army units. The Army National Guard's contribution in this area is providing a balance and maximizing of the total force.

Analysis of the total performance of the Army National Guard indicates it is effectively meeting its requirements to support the National Military Strategy in crisis response and forward presence. The Army National Guard has demonstrated successfully its ability to respond in crisis and to deploy combat units. Those units actually deployed in the Gulf War were technically competent in meeting the

technological demands of a modern war. The Army National Guard has clearly shown it is highly trained in the non-traditional missions and it is a major contributor to forward presence. The Army National Guard is not currently effective in projecting its combat power as demonstrated by the performance of its roundout brigades in the Gulf War. For the Army National Guard to be totally effective in the future, changes are required in the Active Army and the Army National Guard.

## **VI. THE FUTURE AND CHANGE**

The future is a significant challenge for the Active Army and the Army National Guard. The Army National Guard is a force that is capable of doing more when used within specific parameters as a military force. The examples of the Swiss and Israeli systems showed that part-time military forces can be technically competent and combat capable. There is a common thread within these two models that makes them so. Both the Swiss and Israeli systems are an integrated total force. The active and reserve leadership serve alongside one another, integrated in each other's units. They have developed a prioritization concept for missions and units to perform them when called to act. Lastly, they both have created a centralized training strategy with the active component having a greater responsibility for formalized schooling of individuals, units and leaders. These parameters of success need to be adapted to our Army National Guard, along with changes in the total force structure and Title 10.

The most significant problem in meeting the National Military Strategy was the failure in projecting the power of the Army National Guard roundout brigades. To improve the Army National Guard performance in power projection, changes need to be made in the roundout unit concept and their readiness levels.

In every case, to include the roundout brigades, the Army National Guard mobilized units in a shorter time than ever before.<sup>101</sup> Although the mobilization of the Army National Guard is a success story, the deployment and use of the roundout brigades, as said earlier, was not. Why did they fail? The causes to the brigade roundout problems in power projection is hinged on four factors: the lack of a centralized standard training program, inadequately trained leaders, failure to fully integrate the Army National Guard and readiness with the active component, and the adherence to a brigade sized unit roundout policy.<sup>102</sup> Ironically similar lessons were identified from the War of 1812. The report on use of the militia in this war noted that if the militia were to be employed as soon as they were mobilized their peacetime training would need to be efficient.<sup>103</sup>

To correct the roundout problems not only requires established clear-cut, well defined criteria for committing Army National Guard combat units early on, but also changes in the training of those units and the leaders who serve them. The Army National Guard roundout units are special units, with high priority combat missions. Their training readiness should be at a higher level than other organizations and there needs to be a legal mechanism to tap them early in the federalizing process. The earlier Army National Guard units can be used in times of crisis the better.

The Constitution holds the federal authority responsible for the training and readiness of the reserves, but not directly for the Army National Guard. The states maintain training authority. The training strategy needs to be more centralized and the Active Army should be greatly involved in the peacetime training of the Army National Guard at all levels. Emphasis on a centralized training program is critical.

The Army National Guard simply does not have enough time available to train to standard on the hundreds of tasks identified in the Army's training manuals. For example, the roundout brigades did not have an adequate number of training days just to sustain basic proficiency levels.<sup>104</sup> The most critical combat tasks and combat training drills to prepare for war need to be specified at all levels in a manual tailored to the Army National Guard combat units. The Swiss and Israeli systems both have mandated such a program with increased training days. It is worth applying to our Army National Guard. This requires a centralized training program with the Mission Essential Task Lists for both combat and non-combat missions approved by the roundout's Active Army parent unit. The outdated 15 days for annual training needs to be replaced. Proposals have suggested up to three 10 day periods for high priority units.<sup>105</sup> The current number of training days are no longer sufficient for proficiency and should be addressed by changes in Titles 10 and 32.

The training focus should only be on those individual and collective tasks that are vital in wartime missions and combat survival. The Army's Special Operations Command and the Army National Guard 20th Special Forces Group (MA) implemented this type of training strategy in the Gulf War. The 20th Special Forces Group was federalized on 20

February 1991. Although not deployed, they were validated within 45 days. In total three Special Forces Operational Bases, nine Forward Operational Bases, and 43 Operational Detachments (A) were validated. This was accomplished by an intensive training cycle (ITC) integrating active and Army National Guard leadership in a centralized training program stressing go-to-war combat tasks, conditions and standards. The units were in fact combat ready.<sup>106</sup> This idea needs to be implemented at all levels in the Army National Guard from division staff to the squad. It should include formalized training of the leaders and battle staffs.

It takes trained leadership and trained battle staffs to synchronize the multiple battlefield operating systems. Few of the roundout staffs had ever worked together as a battle staff.<sup>107</sup> To correct this training deficiency the Army's training strategy should provide a portable Brigade and Battalion Simulations (BBS) system with specific combat scenarios to hone the staff and commander skills to plan, synchronize and execute in combat. The leadership must be experienced, well trained and technically competent for any success in battle. The Army National Guard battalion and brigade leadership in the Gulf War was deficient and lacked a technical competence and confidence among the officers and non-commissioned officers.<sup>108</sup> The problem largely was created by an inadequate training system.

In the Swiss system the commanders and staff training is formalized and given by the active component. The training requires up to 32 weeks of formal training followed by 14 weeks of practical experience before assuming command.<sup>109</sup> Formal school training was not completed by several roundout brigade and battalion commanders.



This deficiency resulted in many being detached from their units to attend command and staff courses.<sup>110</sup> The formal training system needs to be made mandatory, requiring all officers and non-commissioned officers to attend federal service schools prior to promotion to the next higher level or assumption of command. The benefits of mandatory leader training programs paid substantial dividends to the Israeli Defense Force in the 1973 and 1976 wars. It would do the same for our Army National Guard and Active Army.

The emphasis in the Army National Guard needs to be on smaller, more responsive units. Army National Guard roundouts need to be designated battalions and roundups designated as brigades. The larger the unit the more difficult it is to train and deploy. The Active Army and the Army National Guard force structures need to have smaller units as roundouts and the readiness reporting of those units should be tied to the Active Army parent unit. Readiness expectations were higher than what the roundout units could actually achieve. This was largely because readiness reports on the roundout brigades overstated their post-mobilization readiness levels. The readiness reports used were not specific enough regarding readiness criteria.<sup>111</sup> For the roundout units to be combat effective in regional contingencies the Active Army must accept responsibility for the Guard's readiness.<sup>112</sup> By integrating the Active Army and Army National Guard readiness reports (DA Form 2715), roundout unit combat capabilities will be better understood.


Battalion level combat arms roundout units can be effective. If Army National Guard brigades require a post-mobilization training window of 90-150 days, it is feasible that battalions could do it in

45-60 days. The experience of the United States Marine Corps Reserve in the Gulf War supports this as a valid conclusion. The Marines have reserve battalion combat units similar to the Army's roundout units. The Marine units were validated, deployed, integrated with their active parent units and committed into combat.<sup>113</sup>

The Active Army brigade should have a four battalion task organization with roundout battalions being the fourth unit of an active brigade's task organization. The Army National Guard roundup brigade should maintain a three battalion task organization, rotating one battalion to the Active Army brigade as a roundout battalion every 18 months. The purpose in rotating an Army National Guard battalion as a roundout every 18 months is to fully integrate and cross level the training experience throughout the Army National Guard. The force structure goal should be to have one Army National Guard roundout battalion aligned with every Active Army brigade, two Army National Guard roundup brigades with every Active Army division and every Army National Guard division aligned with an Active Army Corps.

There are advantages to adopting this concept. This concept maximizes the immediate use of Army National Guard combat units and links the Army National Guard to a crisis response role. It also integrates the force structure on a rotational basis. A larger base of Army National Guard units can be called on (i.e. battalions) and because they are smaller, they are more likely to deploy earlier. The Army National Guard brigade gains the benefits from the training experience with the active force, active force training resources are maximized, and both components are fully integrated.

With a battalion roundout concept, combat validation would be accomplished by the Active Army parent division. During peacetime the Army National Guard roundout battalions' training program would be integrated with their Active Army brigade. The Army National Guard roundout battalion would train directly with its active parent unit and would go to the Combat Training Centers with them every 18 months as part of the combat validation process. The proposed battalion roundout concept needs to be carried to all Army National Guard combat units. The force structure model is listed below:



Unlike the Swiss and Israeli models, the Army National Guard is responsible to both federal and state authorities. This dual authority affects the combat readiness of the Active Army and the Army National Guard. Requiring the Army National Guard units to focus on several different missions with different authority levels degrades their effectiveness. The federal and state authorities need to designate specific Army National Guard units with a federal and a state priority and a specific time they are required to be called on in these roles.

During the Spanish American War in 1898, there were provisions for designation of special units to meet federal requirements. The most famous unit was the "Rough Riders." Not quite as well known was the "Volunteer Brigade of Engineers". This brigade consisted of three regiments with 3,500 men. The regiment was armed and equipped as infantry. In total there were 10 volunteer infantry battalions that carried the "special federal unit" designation.<sup>114</sup>

Army National Guard units serving as roundout battalions need to be designated as a Presidential "special federal unit" by law. This designation would be on a rotational basis for the 18 months an Army National Guard battalion serves as a roundout unit. The rotation would be done with the other three battalions in a Army National Guard roundup brigade. While serving in this capacity the Army National Guard roundout battalions would be immediately available only for federal missions and could be called on without PSRC or partial mobilization by the President. This would require a change in Title 10.

Total force integration will improve the readiness and leadership in both components. After the war with Mexico in 1846 such a pro-

posal was made recommending the experienced leadership of the peacetime Regular Army be more effectively distributed through the entire wartime Army.<sup>115</sup> The Army National Guard and the Active Army need to be integrated at the division, brigade and battalion staff levels.

Title 32 allows Regular Army officers to serve in the position of Chief of Staff of an Army National Guard division. This law needs to be expanded to enhance integration at the division, brigade and battalion levels. Changes need to be made to Titles 10 and 32 allowing for the direct assignment of Active Army and Army National Guard officers and NCOs to each component to a specified unit level and position.

The Swiss and Israeli models have adapted such a system and it has a direct relationship to their units combat readiness. The roundout affiliated units (both the active and guard) should designate leader and staff positions within their units to be filled by the other components' officers and NCOs. The roundout leader integration program would improve training, provide cross leveling of leadership and improve at all levels the effectiveness of the unit.

To further enhance the integration effort and the input of trained soldiers in both components, the recruiting efforts need to be combined. Recruiting of soldiers into the active force, Reserves or the Army National Guard should be done by one recruiting system. As it is now they are direct competitors. This combined recruiting system should offer an enlistment option allowing for a soldier to serve for 18 months after Advanced Individual Training with an Active Army unit and then be directly assigned to serve with an Army National

Guard roundout or roundup unit for 18 months. This option would provide an immediate source of skilled and experienced soldiers for the Army National Guard.

Over time the end result of this integration strategy would be a more capable total force with better distributed leadership and experience of both components throughout the Army. Rather than seeing two entirely separate organizations we would see an integrated one with transparent differences.

The key is to define who is required to do what and when they are required to do it. The Active Army and the Army National Guard cannot effectively meet the performance standards of the combat, state and domestic missions without prioritizing them. In establishing a system to prioritize the missions it is important to identify those units which must maintain a high degree of technological and military skills and those which must maintain only a basic level of military skills.<sup>116</sup>

In the mid-1960's, the Cartwell Plan proposed establishing priorities for the Army National Guard. Basically the plan designated high priority and low priority brigades.<sup>117</sup> The high priority brigades were focused on meeting their warfighting and mobilization requirements. The low priority brigades would serve as the nucleus for additional divisions should they be needed.

The central idea of having prioritization and a tiered level of unit readiness is valid. The traditional, non-traditional and domestic missions should be prioritized and given to the units most capable to accomplish them. If the Army National Guard is most capable to accomplish the mission then they should get the mission. Missions should go

to the Army National Guard as long as they can meet required deployment times.

For example, Army National Guard units could be prioritized and designated as Ready 1, Ready 2 and Ready 3 units. Ready 1 units would be Army National Guard battalion roundouts and designated combat support units prepared to go-to-war no later than C+45. Ready 1 units would be capable of meeting the combat missions and crisis response needs of the National Military Strategy. A crisis response role would require enhanced training, highly technical or unique military skills, high peacetime preparedness and short notice response time.<sup>118</sup> They would be deployable with limited post-mobilization training and respond solely to federal traditional (combat) missions. Their training focus would be individual through collective training at the battalion level, validated by a rotation to the Combat Training Centers every 18 months.

Ready 2 as roundup brigades would respond to both federal and state requirements. Their primary training focus would be on individual and collective training at the section, squad, crew, platoon, and company level to meet federal and state missions at these levels NLT C+30. However, for brigade level combat missions, Ready 2 units would require post-mobilization training to meet their federal combat missions not later than C+150.

Ready 3 units would be Army National Guard Divisions with designated brigades and battalions prioritized to respond to the non-combat state and federal domestic missions NLT C+30. Ready 3 Army National Guard units would be trained to combat standards on individual and collective skills at the section, crew, squad and platoon levels

and could provide these assets to specified units not later than C+90 to meet federal combat missions. Requirements for federal combat missions at the division level would be not later than C+365. All Army National Guard Ready 3 units should have a habitual affiliation with an Active Army corps.

The Army National Guard units need to be resourced based on readiness levels that are in line with their assigned missions. This is to ensure their unit readiness is adequate to accomplish the assigned mission.<sup>119</sup> Using this tiered readiness level concept (Ready 1,2,3) based on mission requirements further allows the Army and Army National Guard to prioritize units, missions and resources to meet expected readiness levels.




Figure 3.

Like the Swiss and Israeli models, adopting a method of prioritization provides a clear-cut mission focus for all units and alleviates the problem of all Army National Guard units' trying to train to stan-



dard to meet all federal and state missions. Missions have a direct relationship to probability of occurrence, risk and unit training readiness.

At the start of this paper two needs were identified. First, the changes could not be superficial, but would need to focus on reorganization and structure. Second, the operational environment is no longer the same and this would impact on the roles and missions of our military forces. These needs have remained valid throughout the paper and are the basis for the changes presented.

The Army National Guard is meeting the needs of the current National Military Strategy in the strategic foundations of crisis response and forward presence. However, the Army National Guard is not currently meeting the needs of power projection. The strategic principle of power projection requires these improvements to be made by both the Active Army and the Army National Guard. The future places a significant requirement on the use of military forces in power projection and the Army National Guard is not being used as a full player in this area.

It has been said that "Victory smiles on those who anticipate changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur."<sup>120</sup> The changes proposed in this paper are based on the needs of our National Military Strategy, the reduced defense budget, and the changes in our operational environment. This environment requires the Army National Guard to assume a greater role than ever before. The new era has brought an expanded operational environment and a reduced force structure. Somehow

more must be done with less. This will require the Army National Guard to be more than just a supplemental force.

A viable solution is a greater acceptance, integration of and reliance on the use of the Army National Guard in all the strategic foundations of our National Military Strategy. The Swiss and Israeli militia systems offer useful alternatives to improve the Active Army and the Army National Guard. The 1970's for our Army was the decade of emphasizing combined arms integration; in the 1980's the emphasis was on joint integration; in the 1990's the emphasis should be on total force integration.

For the Army National Guard to effectively meet these requirements change must occur, yet the balance between state authority and federal authority must still be maintained. These proposed changes will enhance the capabilities of the Active Army, improve the Army National Guard to meet the demands of the new era and still maintain the balance of authority sought by the intent of the Constitution.

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Appendix A

INFORMATION PAPER

NGD-ARF-I  
14 August 1992

SUBJECT: Major Army National Guard Units

DIVISIONS

26th Infantry Division (-), Massachusetts  
3d Brigade, Massachusetts  
43d Brigade, Connecticut  
86th Brigade, Vermont  
28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania  
2d Brigade, Pennsylvania  
55th Brigade, Pennsylvania  
56th Brigade, Pennsylvania  
29th Infantry Division (Light) (-), Virginia  
1st Brigade, Virginia  
2d Brigade, Virginia  
3d Brigade, Maryland  
35th Infantry Division (-), Kansas  
67th Brigade, Nebraska  
69th Brigade, Kansas  
149th Brigade, Kentucky  
38th Infantry Division (-), Indiana  
2d Brigade, Indiana  
46th Brigade, Michigan  
76th Brigade, Indiana  
40th Infantry Division (Mechanized), California  
1st Brigade (Mechanized), California  
2d Brigade (Mechanized), California  
3d Brigade (Mechanized), California  
42d Infantry Division, New York  
1st Brigade, New York (inactivated 1 September 1991)  
107th Brigade, New York  
3d Brigade, New York  
34th Infantry Division (-), Minnesota  
1st Brigade, Minnesota  
2d Brigade, Iowa  
66th Brigade, Illinois  
49th Armored Division, Texas  
1st Brigade, Texas  
2d Brigade, Texas  
3d Brigade, Texas  
50th Armored Division (-), New Jersey  
1st Brigade, New Jersey  
2d Brigade, New Jersey (inactivated 1 September 1991)  
36th Brigade, Texas (inactivated 1 September 1992)

## Appendix A

NGB-ARF-I

SUBJECT: Major Army National Guard Units

### COMBAT BRIGADES

27th Infantry Brigade (Light) Round-out, New York  
29th Infantry Brigade (Separate), Hawaii  
30th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Separate), North Carolina  
32d Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Separate), Wisconsin  
33d Infantry Brigade (Separate), Illinois  
37th Infantry Brigade (Separate), Ohio  
39th Infantry Brigade (Separate), Arkansas  
41st Infantry Brigade (Separate), Oregon  
45th Infantry Brigade (Separate), Oklahoma  
48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Round-out), Georgia  
53d Infantry Brigade (Separate), Florida  
81st Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Round-out), Washington  
92d Infantry Brigade (Separate), Puerto Rico  
218th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Separate), South Carolina  
256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Round-out), Louisiana  
30th Armored Brigade (Separate), Tennessee  
31st Armored Brigade (Separate), Alabama  
116th Cavalry Brigade (Round-out), Idaho  
155th Armored Brigade (Round-out), Mississippi  
163d Armored Brigade (Separate), Montana

### ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENTS

107th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Ohio  
    1st Squadron, 150th ACR, West Virginia  
    2d Squadron, 107th Cavalry Regiment, Ohio  
    3d Squadron, 107th Cavalry Regiment, Ohio  
278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Tennessee  
    1st Squadron, 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Tennessee  
    2d Squadron, 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Tennessee  
    3d Squadron, 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Tennessee

### MAJOR SEPARATE HEADQUARTERS UNITS

I Corps Artillery, HHB, Utah  
261st Signal Command, HHC, Delaware  
16th Engineer Brigade, HHC (Theater), Ohio  
30th Engineer Brigade, HHC (Theater), North Carolina  
35th Engineer Brigade, HHC (Corps), Missouri  
194th Engineer Brigade, HHC (Theater), Tennessee  
66th Aviation Brigade, HHC, Washington  
167th Support Command (Corps), HHC, Alabama  
43d Military Police Brigade, HHHC, Rhode Island  
49th Military Police Brigade, HHHC, California  
177th Military Police Brigade, HHHC, Michigan

# Appendix A

## INFORMATION PAPER

NGB-ARF-I  
14 August 1992

SUBJECT: Major Army National Guard Combat/Maneuver Units  
(End FY92)

### DIVISIONS (10)

49	ARMOR	TX	28	INF	PA-WV
50\$	ARMOR	NJ	34	INF	MN-IL-IA-WI
35#	INF(M)	KS-KY-NE-MO-CO	38#	INF	IN-MI
40@	INF(M)	CA-NV	42#	INF	NY-DE
26\$	INF	MA-VT-CT-SC-RI	29	INF	VA-MD

### SEPARATE BRIGADES (13)

30	ARMOR	TN
31	ARMOR	AL
163	ARMOR	WY-MT
30	INF(M)	NC
\$32	INF(M)	WI
29	INF(M)	HI
*33	INF(M)	IL
39	INF(M)	AR
41	INF(M)	OR
#45	INF(M)	OK
53	INF(THEATER DEF)	FL
*73	INF(THEATER DEF)	OH
92	INF(THEATER DEF)	PR

### ALASKAN SCOUT GROUPS (1)

207	INF (SCOUT)	AK
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### ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENTS (2)

\$107	ACR	OH-WV
278	ACR	TN

### SPECIAL FORCES GROUPS (2)

#19	SF	UT-CO-WV-RI
20	SF	AL-MS-FL-MD

@ CONVERTS TO 11.5K CADRE  
IN FY 93

\* CONVERTS TO DIV BDE IN FY 93

# LOSING SUBELEMENTS IN FY 93

\$ INACTIVATING IN FY 93

### ROUNDUP BRIGADES (3)

48	INF(M)	(24 ID [M])	GA
155	ARMOR	(1 CAV DIV)	MS
81	INF(M)	(2 ID)	WA

### ROUNDOUT BRIGADES (4)

116	ARMOR	(4 ID [M])	ID-OR-NV
218	INF(M)	(1 ID [M])	SC
256	INF(M)	(5 ID [M])	LA
27	INF(L)	(10 MTN [L])	NY

### ROUNDOUT BATTALIONS (8)

2-152	ARMOR	(5 ID [M])	AL
1-263	ARMOR	(24 ID [M])	SC
3-123	ARMOR (-)	(194 AR BDE)	KY
3-141	INF(M)	(1 CAV DIV)	TX
2-136	INF(M)	(1 ID [M])	MN
\$2-120	INF(M)	(4 ID [M])	NC
6-297	INF(L)	(6 ID [L])	AK
1-188	AIR DEFENSE	(6 ID [L])	ND

### SEPARATE BATTALIONS (5)

3-172	INF (MTN)	VT-ME-NH
1-108	ARMORED CAV SQDN	MS
2-252	ARMOR	NC
\$1-803	ARMOR	WA
1-294	INF (L) (-)	GAUM

CPT McMillen/DSN 286-7585

Appendix A

INFORMATION PAPER

NGB-ARF-I  
12 August 1992

SUBJECT: Major ARNG CS and CSS Commands (EAD), Including  
Artillery

ENGINEER:

Brigades (4) - BG

16th - OH  
30th - NC  
35th - MO  
194th - TN

Groups (17) - COL

46th - MI	176th - VA
105th - NC	221st - NY
109th - SD	225th - LA
111th - WV	240th - ME
115th - UT	264th - WI
134th - OH	265th - GA
135th - MO	416th - OH
164th - ND	1169th - AL
168th - MS	

ORDNANCE:

Groups (1) - COL

111th - AL

MILITARY POLICE:

Brigades (3) - BG

43rd - RI  
49th - CA  
177th - MI

SIGNAL:

Commands (1) - MG

261st - DE

Brigades (4) - BG

53rd - FL  
142nd - AL  
187th - NY  
228th - SC

QUARTERMASTER:

Corps Support Group (4) - COL

30th - NC  
122nd - AL  
205th - NY  
371st - OH

Area Support Group (9) - COL

31st - AL  
50th - FL  
111th - TX  
114th - MS  
115th - CA  
204th - LA  
213th - PA  
226th - AL (Former Fld Depot)  
329th - VA

Material Mgmt Center (1) - COL

167th - AL

Support Command (1) - MG

167th - AL

TRANSPORTATION:

Brigades (1) - BG

184th - MS

CHEMICAL:

Brigades (1) - BG

404th - IL

AIR DEFENSE

Brigades (3) - BG

111th - NM  
164th - FL  
263rd - SC

Appendix A

NGB-ARF-I

SUBJECT: Major ARNG CS and CSS Commands (EAD), Including  
Artillery

**MEDICAL:**

Brigades (3) - BG

112th - OH

175th - CA

213th - MS

Groups (3) - COL

127th - AL

202nd - FL

244th - NY

Evac Hospitals (7) - COL

109th - AL      199th - FL

143rd - CA      201st - PR

144th - UT      217th - TX

148th - AR

CBT Support Hosps (5) - COL

108th - PA      146th - CA

134th - MS      147th - CO

136th - MD

MF2K

CBT Support Hosp (2) - COL

13th CHS - WI (HUB) MI (HUS)

300th CSH - TN (HUB) SC (HUS)

**AVIATION:**

Brigades (1) - BG

66th - WA

Groups (8) - COL

51st - SC      419th - FL

185th - MS      449th - NC

211th - UT      540th - WA

385th - AZ      635th - MO

Air Traf Control GP (1) - COL

29th - MD

**FIELD ARTILLERY:**

Corps Artillery (1) - BG

I Corps Arty - UT

Brigades (18) - COL

45th - OK

57th - WI

103rd - RI

113th - NC

115th - WY

118th - GA

135th - MO

138th - KY

142nd - AR

147th - SD

151st - SC

153rd - AZ

169th - CO

196th - TN

197th - NH

209th - NY

227th - FL

631st - MS

MAJ Ciccariella/DSN 286-7649

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